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Semantic ScholarVasilis Syrgkanis
Vasileios Syrgkanis
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- affiliation: Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
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2010 – today
- 2018
[c38]Jimmy Wu, Diondra Peck, Scott Hsieh, Vandana Dialani, Constance D. Lehman, Bolei Zhou, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Lester W. Mackey, Genevieve Patterson:
Expert identification of visual primitives used by CNNs during mammogram classification. Medical Imaging: Computer-Aided Diagnosis 2018: 105752T- [c37]Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Truthful Multi-Parameter Auctions with Online Supply: an Impossible Combination. SODA 2018: 753-769 - [c36]Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Simple vs Optimal Contests with Convex Costs. WWW 2018: 1429-1438 - [i48]Jonas Mueller, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Matt Taddy:
Low-rank Bandit Methods for High-dimensional Dynamic Pricing. CoRR abs/1801.10242 (2018) - [i47]Akshay Krishnamurthy, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Semiparametric Contextual Bandits. CoRR abs/1803.04204 (2018) - [i46]Jimmy Wu, Diondra Peck, Scott Hsieh, Vandana Dialani, Constance D. Lehman, Bolei Zhou, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Lester W. Mackey, Genevieve Patterson:
Expert identification of visual primitives used by CNNs during mammogram classification. CoRR abs/1803.04858 (2018) - [i45]Greg Lewis, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Adversarial Generalized Method of Moments. CoRR abs/1803.07164 (2018) - 2017
- [j3]Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
The Price of Anarchy in Auctions. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 59: 59-101 (2017) - [c35]Miroslav Dudík, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Oracle-Efficient Online Learning and Auction Design. FOCS 2017: 528-539 - [c34]
- [c33]Robert S. Chen, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives. NIPS 2017: 4708-4717 - [c32]Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Sample Complexity Measure with Applications to Learning Optimal Auctions. NIPS 2017: 5358-5365 - [c31]
- [i44]Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Simple vs Optimal Mechanisms in Auctions with Convex Payments. CoRR abs/1702.06062 (2017) - [i43]Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Optimal Learning from Multiple Information Sources. CoRR abs/1703.06367 (2017) - [i42]Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Sample Complexity Measure with Applications to Learning Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/1704.02598 (2017) - [i41]Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Proof of Orthogonal Double Machine Learning with Z-Estimators. CoRR abs/1704.03754 (2017) - [i40]Robert S. Chen, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives. CoRR abs/1707.01047 (2017) - [i39]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Elie Tamer, Juba Ziani:
Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information. CoRR abs/1710.03830 (2017) - [i38]Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Haoyang Zeng:
Training GANs with Optimism. CoRR abs/1711.00141 (2017) - [i37]Lester W. Mackey, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Ilias Zadik:
Orthogonal Machine Learning: Power and Limitations. CoRR abs/1711.00342 (2017) - [i36]Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation. CoRR abs/1711.01295 (2017) - [i35]Zhe Feng, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Value. CoRR abs/1711.01333 (2017) - [i34]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Christos Tzamos:
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization. CoRR abs/1711.02601 (2017) - [i33]Yash Deshpande, Lester W. Mackey, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Matt Taddy:
Accurate Inference for Adaptive Linear Models. CoRR abs/1712.06695 (2017) - 2016
- [c30]Constantinos Daskalakis, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy. FOCS 2016: 219-228 - [c29]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Akshay Krishnamurthy, Robert E. Schapire:
Efficient Algorithms for Adversarial Contextual Learning. ICML 2016: 2159-2168 - [c28]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Haipeng Luo, Akshay Krishnamurthy, Robert E. Schapire:
Improved Regret Bounds for Oracle-Based Adversarial Contextual Bandits. NIPS 2016: 3135-3143 - [c27]Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games. EC 2016: 661 - [c26]Thodoris Lykouris, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population. SODA 2016: 120-129 - [c25]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The price of anarchy in large games. STOC 2016: 963-976 - [c24]David M. Pennock, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Bounded Rationality in Wagering Mechanisms. UAI 2016 - [i32]Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments. CoRR abs/1601.07163 (2016) - [i31]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Akshay Krishnamurthy, Robert E. Schapire:
Efficient Algorithms for Adversarial Contextual Learning. CoRR abs/1602.02454 (2016) - [i30]Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games. CoRR abs/1602.07570 (2016) - [i29]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Haipeng Luo, Akshay Krishnamurthy, Robert E. Schapire:
Improved Regret Bounds for Oracle-Based Adversarial Contextual Bandits. CoRR abs/1606.00313 (2016) - [i28]Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
The Price of Anarchy in Auctions. CoRR abs/1607.07684 (2016) - [i27]Miroslav Dudík, Nika Haghtalab, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Oracle-Efficient Learning and Auction Design. CoRR abs/1611.01688 (2016) - 2015
- [j2]Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Algorithmic game theory and econometrics. SIGecom Exchanges 14(1): 105-108 (2015) - [c23]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. AAAI 2015: 872-878 - [c22]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire:
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games. NIPS 2015: 2989-2997 - [c21]Jason D. Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games. NIPS 2015: 3061-3069 - [c20]
- [c19]
- [c18]Vasilis Syrgkanis, David Kempe, Éva Tardos:
Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals. EC 2015: 303 - [c17]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies. EC 2015: 305-322 - [c16]Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration. EC 2015: 565-582 - [c15]Nicole Immorlica, Gregory Stoddard, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Social Status and Badge Design. WWW 2015: 473-483 - [i26]Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration. CoRR abs/1502.04147 (2015) - [i25]Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Price of Stability in Games of Incomplete Information. CoRR abs/1503.03739 (2015) - [i24]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. CoRR abs/1503.04755 (2015) - [i23]Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1503.05608 (2015) - [i22]Thodoris Lykouris, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population. CoRR abs/1505.00391 (2015) - [i21]Darrell Hoy, Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Robust Data-Driven Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions. CoRR abs/1505.00437 (2015) - [i20]Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Econometrics for Learning Agents. CoRR abs/1505.00720 (2015) - [i19]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire:
Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games. CoRR abs/1507.00407 (2015) - [i18]Jason D. Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games. CoRR abs/1507.00418 (2015) - [i17]Vasilis Syrgkanis, Johannes Gehrke:
Pricing Queries Approximately Optimally. CoRR abs/1508.05347 (2015) - [i16]Constantinos Daskalakis, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy. CoRR abs/1511.01411 (2015) - [i15]Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Multi-parameter Auctions with Online Supply. CoRR abs/1511.03699 (2015) - 2014
- [c14]Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic:
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics. SAGT 2014: 218-230 - [i14]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. CoRR abs/1408.1211 (2014) - [i13]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 21: 103 (2014) - 2013
- [c13]Evangelos Bampas, Aris Pagourtzis, George Pierrakos, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Selfish Resource Allocation in Optical Networks. CIAC 2013: 25-36 - [c12]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. EC 2013: 453-470 - [c11]
- [c10]Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic:
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments. WINE 2013: 26-39 - [c9]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. WINE 2013: 160-173 - [c8]Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects. WINE 2013: 347-360 - [c7]Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions. WINE 2013: 422-435 - [i12]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1305.0598 (2013) - [i11]Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Auctions vs Negotiations in Irregular Markets. CoRR abs/1306.4022 (2013) - [i10]Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic:
Strong Price of Anarchy and Coalitional Dynamics. CoRR abs/1307.2537 (2013) - [i9]Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic:
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments. CoRR abs/1308.0990 (2013) - [i8]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. CoRR abs/1309.2529 (2013) - [i7]
- [i6]Nicole Immorlica, Gregory Stoddard, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Social Status and Badge Design. CoRR abs/1312.2299 (2013) - 2012
- [j1]Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
The dining bidder problem: à la russe et à la française. SIGecom Exchanges 11(2): 25-28 (2012) - [c6]
- [c5]
- [c4]Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Sequential auctions and externalities. SODA 2012: 869-886 - [c3]Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz:
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions. WINE 2012: 526-531 - [i5]
- [i4]
- [i3]Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz:
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/1210.0275 (2012) - [i2]
- 2011
- [i1]Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Sequential Auctions and Externalities. CoRR abs/1108.2452 (2011) - 2010
- [c2]
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c1]Evangelos Bampas, Aris Pagourtzis, George Pierrakos, Vasileios Syrgkanis:
Colored Resource Allocation Games. CTW 2009: 68-72
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2018-04-17 22:25 CEST by the dblp team